Introduction
A cursory glance at Wittgenstein's work, early and late, reveals a preoccupation with language, both as a source of philosophical puzzlement concerning concepts like time, knowledge, causation, and value, and as a phenomenon which is itself puzzling in various respects. One of the key innovations in Wittgenstein's later philosophy is the introduction of language-games. As I shall explain, Wittgenstein appeals to language-games in an effort to dispel the kinds of puzzlement just mentioned, as well as to illuminate language itself.
In comparison to talk of language-games, Wittgenstein talks of forms of life infrequently. Nonetheless, he is clear that the significance of the former lies in large part in its connection to the latter (PI §23). 1 In what follows, I shall explain this connection. Having done so, I shall consider to what extent the view which emerges from Wittgenstein's remarks on language-games overlaps with a prominent view in contemporary philosophy of language.
Objects of comparison
In the first instance, Wittgenstein uses the phrase 'language-game' to refer to a (fictional)
'complete primitive language' (PI §2), which one could also view 'as one of those games by 1 I use the standard references to Wittgenstein's texts throughout.
2 means of which children learn their native language' (PI §7). Reflection on language-games, so conceived, is supposed to serve a therapeutic purpose: 'It disperses the fog' (PI §5). To appreciate this, consider the so-called 'Augustinian picture':
The words in language name objects-sentences are combinations of such names.-In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands. (PI  §1) A picture like this, Wittgenstein suggests, feeds various forms of philosophical puzzlement.
Consider:
(1) Elliot is larger than Stanley.
(2) Seven is larger than five.
(1) contains proper names, 'Elliot' and 'Stanley', which refer to individuals, in this case persons, which one might bump into, say, if one were in Southampton. It is natural to think that knowing what those words signify in some sense involves knowing those individuals, knowledge one might acquire by meeting them.
(2) is superficially similar in form to (1)-they share a 'surface grammar' (cf. PI §664). Accordingly, one might think that 'seven' and 'five' are also names which refer to individuals, presumably numbers. Might one bump into those individuals? Presumably not.
Where, then, are they to be found, if not in Southampton? And how can one know what the names signify, if not by meeting their bearers? One soon finds oneself in deep philosophical waters. (I haven't even touched upon 'is larger than'!)
Needless to say, this is a toy example-I am not suggesting anyone has fallen into confusion in such a simple-minded fashion-but it suffices for present purposes.
After sketching the Augustinian picture, Wittgenstein introduces his notorious builders:
3 A is building with building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass him the stones and to do so in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they make use of a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar", "slab", "beam". A calls them out;
B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. (PI  §2) This language, Wittgenstein says, could be taught 'demonstratively'. The teacher directs the child's attention to a certain sort of stone, perhaps by pointing, and pronounces a word. Later, the teacher says a word and the child is rewarded if she brings one sort of stone, punished otherwise (cf. BB 77).
Wittgenstein invites us to consider 'an extension' of the game:
The builder's man knows by heart the series of words from one to ten. On being given the order, "Five slabs!", he goes to where the slabs are kept, says the words from one to five, takes up a slab for each word, and carries them to the builder. (BB 79; cf. PI §8)
The builders use the numerals exclusively for counting. Significantly, the teaching of this game would be different. A child must memorise 'the series of number words' (PI §9). And, where the teaching is demonstrative, 'the same word, e.g., "three", will be taught by pointing either to slabs, or to bricks, or to columns, etc.' (BB 79).
These language-games are supposed to help us see how very different the functioning of count nouns, like 'pillar', is from the functioning of numerals, like 'five', differences the Augustinian picture slurs over. This might help us steer clear of the waters broached above.
In Clearly, a language like English is quite unlike the builders' 'system of communication'. For Wittgenstein, language-games serve 'as objects of comparison which, through similarities and dissimilarities, are meant to throw light on features of our language' (PI §130). Our 'everyday language', he says, is 'highly complicated' in ways which make it hard to survey and (so) apt to cause confusion. In contrast, language-games are 'clear-cut and transparent', though 'we recognize in these simple processes forms of language not separated by a break from our more complicated ones' (BB 17; cf. ' (1992: 202) . This is fine, if it means that the conditions for the correct use of an expression are determined only by the rules of the relevant language-game, which are conventional and arbitrary (PI § §355, 497; PR §4). But it is mistaken, if it means that whether those conditions are satisfied on a given occasion of use is determined only by what is going on in the game, by its rules or by the other linguistic moves its participants make, as opposed to language-(game-)independent reality. The rules of the language-game settle what counts as correctly using 'red', for example, by including the principle that 'red' be applied only to this (pointing to a sample of red) (cf. PI §50). But whether one accords with this principle on a given occasion, and so correctly uses 'red', depends on whether one applies it to an object which is, in fact, red. As Wittgenstein remarks, 'If I say falsely that something is red, then all the same, it is red that it isn't' (PI §429).
Above, I indicated how reflection on language-games is supposed to address specific forms of puzzlement. Wittgenstein's presentation of language as a rule-governed activity might address puzzlement concerning language itself, of a sort Horwich describes:
What is meaning? Why are some sounds imbued with it and others not? How, for example, does it come about that the word 'dog' means precisely what it does? How is it possible for those intrinsically inert ink-marks […] to reach out into the world and latch on to a definite portion of reality: namely, the dogs? (1998: 1) The idea that language is a game, and that uses of expressions are moves in it, might provide the beginnings of an answer to such questions: 'Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life?-In use it lives' (PI §432; cf. BB 4).
(Forms of) life(-forms)
Does presenting language as a game address the worries about 'dead' signs? After all, there are many activities in which tokens are moved subject to rules but in which those tokens do not possess meaning, and (so) cannot be used to say things, including, of course, games (cf.
Lycan 2000 If there were peoples whose troops moved in battle according to the same laws as the pieces on the chessboard, then a position of chess pieces would acquire a meaning at once, and the officers would then bend over the chessboard just as they would now over strategic maps […] The movements of the pieces would simply be a representation of events in reality and not a 'mere game'. It is important to stress that Wittgenstein does not mention circumstances of significant activity into which language-games are woven only to address the 'mere game' objectionhis remarks highlight a feature of language-games, their embeddedness in larger contexts, already present. Such contexts are not supplementary to language-games but integral to them.
From the outset, Wittgenstein presents each language-game as a 'whole, consisting of language and the activities into which it is woven' (PI §7). Again: 'The word "languagegame" is used here to emphasize the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life' (PI §23). Thus, 'To imagine a language is to imagine a form of life' (PI §19).
Following Cavell (1989) , one can distinguish 'vertical' and 'horizontal' senses of 'form of life'. The vertical, broadly-speaking biological, sense concerns the life-form which 8 each of us shares, the human organism, with all its physiological peculiarities. Our use of colour terms, for example, is bound up with, and so depends upon, the fact that we are endowed with a specific visual apparatus:
Imagine a tribe of colour-blind people, and there could easily be one. They would not have the same colour concepts as we do. For even assuming they speak, e.g. English, and thus have all the English colour words, they would still use them differently than we do and would learn their use differently. (RC I §13)
Similarly, that we play certain language-games is dependent on certain 'very general facts of nature' (PPF §365; cf. OC §63; Z § §351-352). To adapt one of Wittgenstein's examples (PI §142), our terms of measurement might not have application were objects to expand and contract randomly.
The horizontal, broadly-speaking social, sense concerns ways of life, which humans might or might not share (cf. RFM VI §34). In Wittgenstein's view, 'What belongs to a language-game is a whole culture' (LC I §26). It is difficult to give uncontroversial examples of terms the use of which is bound up with, and so depends upon, habits and customs which reflect the outlook of a certain group; but consider how the practices involving 'chivalrous' are caught up in ways difficult to spell out with certain socio-historical circumstances, which have now passed, and certain values and principles, which are now foreign to us.
In a still more difficult to pin down fashion, Brandom 2008: 42; Rhees 1959 Rhees -1960 ; be that as it may, there might be language-games which do so qualify.
Context(ualism)
I have outlined several respects in which, for Wittgenstein, language-games are inextricably bound to wider contexts-they are peculiar to environments, natural and social, tied to purposive activities, and play certain roles in, or for, the forms of life their participants To bring this down to earth, consider: (1991: 242) In strikingly similar terms, Conant writes:
Wittgenstein thinks that it is a misunderstanding of how language works to think […] that the role of a sentence in our language is to be that which on its own bat allows for the expression of a determinate thought-a determinacy which is achieved simply as a function of (1) Those who find contextualism in Wittgenstein often view his talk of language-games as primarily concerning, not rule-governed activities one might participate in on different occasions, but actual, concrete, embedded uses of language on specific occasions (cf. Conant, 1998: 233) . In this manner, Travis writes: So, Wittgenstein is suggesting that context determines whether a language-game is being played-and so whether subjects are employing expressions subject to the rules of that game. He is not suggesting that context plays a further role, namely, determining which of many propositions the expressions subject to those rules express. Compare: the fact that not just any context in which subjects move pieces shaped like castles and horses around a chequered board counts as one in which subjects are playing chess does not entail that, in different contexts in which subjects count as playing chess, the pieces have a different significance (cf. PI §200).
One might think that the final passage shows Wittgenstein to be a contextualist, since he claims there that the meaning of a sentence (in the sense of the proposition expressed) 'is determined by the situation', as opposed, perhaps, to the general rules governing its constituents. In turn, one might think that, on this view, a different situation might 'determine' that the same sentence has a different meaning (in the relevant sense).
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But the passage says nothing whatsoever about different situations determining different meanings; it speaks only of words having 'a' meaning 'in certain contexts'. The point, again, seems to be that 'the situation' 'determines' that the sentence bears a certain meaning insofar as whether one counts as playing the relevant language-game, and so as using that sentence with that meaning, depends upon the circumstances. If they are not appropriate, one is not playing that language-game, but some other language-game (with similar sign-designs) or none at all.
Note that it is no part of the reading presented here that, for Wittgenstein, a sentence might fail to express a proposition in a given situation because the meaning it has somehow clashes with that situation, 'because of an incompatibility between the Satz and the context of use' (Conant 1998: 223) . Nor is it part of that reading that the rules governing the expressions the sentence contains somehow determine that they fail to express a proposition or bear a meaning in that context. The proposal is only that, for Wittgenstein, absenting a suitable context with suitable purposes being served, the use of a string of signs does not qualify as the use of words bearing certain meanings or expressing a certain proposition, and so as governed by certain rules, more simply, as the playing of a certain language-game.
I know that that's a tree
Consider again: In these remarks, Wittgenstein makes a familiar point. If I am to count as playing the relevant language-game with a sentence like, 'I know that that's a tree', and so if it is to have the 17 meaning that it does (as determined by the rules governing its parts), the 'background' or 'situation' must be appropriate, one in which the use of those words can be seen to be serving suitable purposes. Without such a context, the sentence lies 'outside its language-game' (OC §393).
Once again, there is no suggestion that context plays an additional role, namely, supplementing whatever meaning the expressions have in virtue of being subject to the general rules of the language-game and, thereby, determining which of many propositions is expressed in their use. For all that Wittgenstein says above, if the circumstances are such that I count in them as playing the ('familiar', 'everyday') language-game with 'I know that that's a tree', then I count (in that context) as expressing the proposition that I know that that's a tree, the proposition I would express by using that sentence in any context in which I count as playing that game.
Conant might complain that I skipped this overtly contextualist passage:
"I know that that's a tree"-this may mean all sorts of things: I look at a plant that I take for a young beech and that someone else thinks is a black-currant. He says "that is a shrub"; I say it is a tree.-We see something in the mist which one of us takes for a man, and the other says "I know that that's a tree". So, Wittgenstein's point, again, is that a suitable occasion involving suitable purposes is required if a sentence is to bear a certain meaning, and hence express a certain proposition, that is, if one is to count as playing a certain language-game. Nothing Wittgenstein says here points toward the idea that the same sentence, with whatever meaning it bears independently of an occasion of use, might express different propositions on different occasions. Moreover, and crucially, these passages are in addition addressing 'a lack of clarity about the role of imaginability in our investigation. Namely, about the extent to which it ensures that a sentence makes sense' (PI §395). So, not only are Wittgenstein's remarks not in the service 22 of promoting contextualism, thinking that they are prevents us from seeing the work they are supposed to be doing. For Wittgenstein, the meaningful use of language involves rule-governed practices of employing expressions tied to provincial points and purposes, embedded in specific natural and social environments, bound up with, indeed manifesting, distinctive forms of life.
Conclusion
Contextualism, of the sort explored here, might be more of a hindrance than a help when it comes to appreciating the importance Wittgenstein sees in this. 
